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1 Introduction
“Compared to North America, the average university in Europe, generates far fewer
inventions and patents. This is largely due to a less systematic and professional man-
agement of knowledge and intellectual property by European universities.”
(European Commission, 2007)
“Contrary to the paradox conjecture, European weaknesses reside both in its system of
scientific research and in a relatively weak industry.”
(Dosi, Llerena, Sylos-Labini, 2006)
The European Commission (EC) has stressed in several occasions1 that Europe has been less
successful than the US at converting its academic results into economic outcomes. In a number
of documents it has advocated the importance of improving knowledge transfer between public
research institutions and third parties, including civil society and industry partners.
The argument behind the EC’s concerns is that while European research institutions are good at
producing academic research outputs, they are not as good when it comes to transfer these outputs
to the economy. This argument is known as the “European Paradox”.
A number of economic studies contested the validity of the claim that European academic
institutions are good at producing scientific knowledge (of quality). Controlling for the relative size
of Europe and the US, Dosi et al. (2005) show that European countries are significantly lagging
behind the US with respect to a number of indicators for academic quality, including the volume
of publications and article’s citations. Bauwens et al. (2008) point to the “massive” dominance of
American universities in the total sample of ISI Highly Cited Scientists. They highlight that the
gap in productivity between Europe and the US is due, in part, to a lack of financial resources
made available for universities and research in Europe, but also to inefficiencies in the way these
resources are managed.
Other studies have investigated whether it is true that the main weakness of European academic
institutions lies in translating scientific knowledge into innovations. Crespi et al. (2008) show that
while Europe lags behind the US in terms of university-owned patents, the gap becomes smaller
when university-invented patents are taken into consideration. They analyzed the situation in six
major European countries and showed that two thirds of the patents with at least one university
1See, for example, the Green Paper on Innovation (EC, 1995), the Third Report on Science and Technology
Indicators (EC, 2003) or the communication titled ”Improving knowledge transfer between research institutions and
industry across Europe -embracing open innovation - Implementing the Lisbon Agenda” (EC, 2007).
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inventor are not owned by universities. Similar results are found by Lissoni et al. (2008) who show
that in France, Italy and Sweden most academic patents are not university-owned. These studies
all focus on patents as a measure for technology transfer. This was partly due to a lack of quality
data on licensing outcomes in Europe.
This study gives a contribution to understanding whether a “European Paradox” exists and, in
case, what the causes could be. We tackle a specific aspect of university technology transfer which
is the licensing activity of university technology transfer offices (TTOs) and we investigate whether
US TTOs conclude more licenses and earn more license revenue than their European colleagues.
For this purpose, we complement public information available on US and European universities
with new survey data on university technology transfer offices in Europe and in the US. The survey
administered to European TTOs included questions on quantitative outcomes (i.e. number of
licenses executed and license income) as well as other questions on objectives, metrics of success,
staffing levels and composition. The target population was TTOs of universities located in Western
Europe whose researchers published more than 200 scientific articles during the period 2004-2006.
The response rate was 59.4%, with 211 answers coming from 15 countries. The survey administered
to US TTOs was aimed at integrating the information available from the AUTM survey with
questions on objectives, metrics of success and TTOs staffing composition. The target population
was selected in the same way as for Europe and the response rate was 58%, with 89 answers.
In the first part of the analysis, we find that, having controlled for measures of academic scientific
production and quality, academic orientation, demand for technology, national policies on university
intellectual property rights (professor’s privilege) and TTO staffing levels and experience, European
TTOs do not execute less licenses than their US colleagues. However, they earn significantly less
revenue from licenses. These results are robust to different specifications of the econometric model.
These results lead to a reinterpretation of the European Paradox. Differences in scientific
performance between Europe and the US, pointed out by Dosi et al. (2005), explain a large of
part of the difference in licensing outcomes. Once we control for scientific performance and other
relevant factors, the difference between Europe and the US in the number of licenses vanishes while
the difference in license revenue remains significant.
In the second part of the analysis, we explore the differences between Europe and the US that
might explain why European TTOs earn less income than their US colleagues. We focus on three
main hypotheses: 1) US TTOs place a greater emphasis on “generating revenue”as an objective; 2)
US TTOs employ more staff with experience in the industry sector who might be more skilled at
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negotiating the financial clauses of licensing contracts; 3) US TTOs have greater flexibility in the
management of their budget, including bonus pay for negotiating high revenue licenses and higher
salaries and benefits to attract quality staff.
Contrary to our expectations, US TTOs do not attach more importance than their European
colleagues to generating revenue when compared to other objectives such us local development and
faculty service. However, 77% of the US respondents contended that the head of their TTO had
at least five years experience in industry, while in Europe the percentage was 43%. Finally 67% of
the US respondents said that they receive a direct share of license revenue, while in Europe this
percentage is 28%.
In line with other studies investigating the “European Paradox”, we considered Europe as a
homogeneous entity. However, we show there are significant differences among European countries.
Specifically, countries that have still in place the professor’s privilege (Italy and Sweden), or that
have recently abandoned it (Norway and Finland) seem to underperform the other countries. On
the other end, countries like Switzerland and Belgium do significantly better than the European
average.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the determinants of TTOs
productivity. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes differences in TTO
organization and staffing that might explain why European TTOs earn less license income than
their US counterparts. Section 5 concludes.
2 A review of the determinants of TTOs productivity
University Technology Transfer Offices are often seen as bridge institutions between universities
and industry (Siegel et al. 1999). Their role is to facilitate the transmission of university knowledge
to the economy.
Several studies have attempted to discern the factors affecting the productivity of TTOs, mea-
sured mainly in terms of number of licenses and license revenue (Thursby and Kemp, 1998; Siegel et
al., 1999; Thursby et al., 2001; Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Friedman and Silberman, 2003; Lach and
Schankerman, 2003; Chapple et al., 2005; Belenzon and Schankerman, 2007; Macho-Stadler et al.,
forthcoming). The majority of these studies have analyzed the functioning of TTOs in the US. The
interest in US university technology transfer is mainly driven by the “dramatic rise” in university
licensing since the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. In recent years, university technology
transfer has gained momentum also among policy makers and economists in Europe. As mentioned
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earlier, the European Commission in its communication “Improving knowledge transfer between
research institutions and industry across Europe: embracing open innovation – implementing the
Lisbon Agenda” (2007), notes that Europe has been less successful than the US at commercial-
izing academic research results. An increasing number of studies have started investigating the
phenomenon of university technology transfer in Europe, with analyses at the country (Chapple et
al., 2005) or at the academic institution level (Macho-Stadler et al., forthcoming). Inter-country
comparisons are still lacking, mainly because of data availability issues.
When examining the licensing activities of TTOs, the economic literature has made a distinc-
tion between TTOs outputs and inputs. In the majority of cases the outputs are represented by
the number of licenses and the license revenue. The inputs are usually classified into four main
categories.
The first category includes the technology that is produced by an academic institution. As
mentioned above, TTOs are expected to work with university inventions and ensure that there
are disseminated in the economy. Measuring university technology is not an easy task though.
Some economists suggest using the number of invention disclosures. This proxy seems to work
well in studies on US university technology transfer. In fact, in the US, at least in principle,
faculty members are required to disclose inventions to their TTOs. However, the same is not
true in Europe where, in many cases, there are no formal requirements for academic scientists
to disclose inventions. Other economists suggest using the number of patents. This measure,
however, has serious drawbacks for a number of reasons. First, it is not clear whether patents are
an input for licenses or vice-versa. In fact, in many cases, patents are filed only after a license is
negotiated between an academic institution and the industry counterpart. Moreover, as we realized
by discussing with technology transfer professionals in Europe, patents are often considered as an
output per se by TTOs. Further, licenses are not always backed by patents as in the case, for
instance, of software technology. Finally, in Europe, the same argument as for invention disclosures
applies. Since academic researchers are usually not required to disclose their inventions to academic
TTOs, the latter do not always have a recording of the patents that are filed by the researchers of
their institution. Chapple et al. (2005) have suggested using total research income has a proxy for
the stock of university technology, when analyzing the factors affecting TTOs productivity in the
UK.
The second category includes the characteristics of the academic institution in which a TTO
operates, namely the quality of the institution and its research orientation. The impact of quality on
university technology transfer is twofold. On one hand, it affects the quality of the technology that
is being produced; on the other hand, it impacts the “perception” a company has of the quality of
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university technology. As for the research orientation, it is commonly thought that institutions with
a strong focus on engineering and life science tend to produce output that is more easily transferred
to the industry sector, either because of its applied nature or because industry is interested in
absorbing this output.
The third category encompasses the demand for technology in the geographical area where the
academic institution is located. The logic is that TTOs will find it easier to conclude licensing
agreements if there is a local demand for it. Moreover, the presence of high-tech companies in the
proximity of an academic institution might have an influence on the output that is produced by
the institution. The problem arising with measures of high-tech density is the definition of the
appropriate geographical area. It is not always clear whether the geographic unit should be the
county, the state (in case of federal organizations) or in some cases even the whole country.
The last category includes the characteristics specific to a TTO, namely the size of the staff
and experience, the latter being measured by number of years since the foundation. It is commonly
believed that the relationship between TTO size and output is characterized by diminishing returns
to scale. Thus, adding one staff affects positively the number of licenses and license revenue, however
the impact is decreasing with the number of staff that is added. Also, TTOs experience is usually
found to have a positive effect on the output of a TTO, with a notable exception represented by
Chapple et al. (2005).
There are, however, other factors that affect university technology transfer and that only re-
cently have started to be investigated. These factors are: TTOs objectives, incentives and staff skill
composition. TTOs objectives are important in shaping the activities performed by these offices.
Their definition is often the result of the interplay of a number of institutions, including national
and local authorities, the academic administration and the TTO itself. Belenzon and Schankerman
(2007) find that TTOs with strong local development objectives earn less revenue from licenses and
tend to make more licenses with local startup companies. The role of incentive pay on TTOs licens-
ing activities has been analyzed by Belenzon and Shankerman (2007) who find that the adoption
of incentive pay affects positively income earned from licenses. Finally, staff skills are of crucial
importance when analyzing TTOs licensing activities. Interviews conducted by Siegel et al. (1999)
suggest that staff with experience in the industry sector may better understand the needs and values
of private companies. Conti et al. (2007) find evidence for the importance of personnel with a PhD
in science to facilitate communication between academics and the TTO.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Survey data
European data. This paper is based on a new survey of university technology transfer offices in
Europe conducted in the summer 2008.
Pre-existing European data on university technology licensing suffer from important limitations.
Most surveys are national-based and thus limited in scope. There are two surveys from professional
associations covering several European countries. The survey from the Association of Science and
Technology professionals includes only 75 answers from universities in its 2007 edition. The Proton
survey includes more answers but suffers from severe problems of representativity, consistency and
sample selection. Finally, none of these surveys have made their results publicly available at a
disaggregated level2, as is the case in the US.
The target population of our survey was TTOs of universities located in Western European
countries whose researchers published more than 200 scientific articles during the period 2004-2006.
Although there are a number of universities below that threshold, we expected that their technology
transfer output would be rather limited and that many of them may not have a technology transfer
office in the first place. A total of 351 universities met our eligibility requirements.
The contact persons for technology transfer were identified from university websites. The di-
rectors of the technology transfer offices were then contacted by phone and invited to answer an
online questionnaire. In a small number of cases no contact person for technology transfer could be
identified; we expect these cases to be universities that do not provide technology transfer services
to faculty.
The questionnaire included questions on objectives, metrics, organisation, staffing levels and
composition as well as licensing outcomes. To increase the response rate, we did not ask for the
license income directly but asked respondents in which category their license income fell3.
The response rate was 59.4% with 211 answers. We have answers coming from 15 countries
with four or more answers for each country. Response rates are higher than the average for small
countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Finland, Portugal and Ireland. The
lowest response rates are for Germany with 27 answers out of 61 universities in the target population
2The ASTP has made the anonymized results of its survey available to some researchers on request.
3Prior testing showed that despite our promise of confidentiality some respondents were unwilling to indicate their
exact license income, in particular if they had a very large or very small license income. The intervals were: less
30’000 euros, between 30’000 and 100’000 euros, between 100’000 and 300’000 euros, between 300’000 and 1 million
euros and more than 1 million euros.
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(44.2%) and Italy with 23 out of 51 (46%). The average university in our sample produced 2295
scientific publications in the period 2004-2006, which is slightly higher than the average university
in the target population (2182 publications).
US data. Data on university technology licensing in the US is readily available from the As-
sociation University Technology Managers (AUTM) survey. We use the data from the publicly
available 2006 AUTM survey which includes answers from 154 US universities. The coverage of the
AUTM survey is excellent as it includes answers from 85% of US universities that have more than
200 scientific publications in Science and Engineering.
The AUTM survey did not include some of the questions we were interested in. Thus we con-
tacted the respondents of the AUTM survey and asked them to answer a small number of additional
questions from our European survey. We sent the survey to the 154 TTOs who had answered to the
2007 AUTM survey. We received 89 answers out of the target population of 154 respondents, i.e. a
response rate of 58%. Our sample is broadly representative of the total population but smaller in-
stitutions are somewhat over-represented. The average number of publications for our respondents
is 3835, whereas the average number for the entire population is 4381.
In the quantitative part of the paper we use the full AUTM sample (i.e. all AUTM survey
respondents) while in the qualitative part we use the results of our US survey.
3.2 Descriptive statistics on licensing outcomes
It is interesting to first consider the differences in raw numbers between the US and Europe. Figure
4 displays a box plot of the numbers of licenses executed by US and European Universities. The
mean number of licenses for European universities is only 7.8 compared to 26.4 for the US. The
difference is not due to just a small number of strong performers in the United States. In fact, the
median number of licenses for European universities is only 4 compared to 13 for US universities.
The differences in license income are equally striking. Figure 2 displays the number of univer-
sities who earn license revenues in the relevant categories4. Only 18 European universities have
license revenues in excess of one million euros, whereas 71 US universities do. At the other end of
the distribution, 81 European universities have license revenues below 30’000 euros, whereas only
9 US universities do.
4For US universities we know the exact license income figures but we convert the them to intervals to make them
comparable with European data. We used the exchange rate prevailing on the first of January 2007 to convert the
dollar amounts in euros.
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Figure 1: Number of licenses
Figure 2: License income in thousand euros
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These raw numbers suggest a superior licensing performance for US universities. However, this
could be caused by US universities producing more knowledge or putting more effort into technology
licensing.
3.3 Econometric specification
Regressions of the number of licenses. Since the number of licenses can take only discrete and
positive values, we assume it is governed by a Poisson process. In order to account for overdispersion,
we use a negative binomial specification which generalizes the Poisson distribution by introducing
an individual, unobserved effect into the conditional mean. The conditional expectation of the
number of licences negotiated by a TTO can then be expressed as:
E [Y |X] = exp(Xiβ + ei) = exp(Xiβ) exp(ei) = exp(Xiβ)δi
Where:
• Y = # licences
• Xi = vector of control variables
• δi ∼ Γ( 1α ) with α > 0, which implies E(δi) = 1 and V ar(δi) = α
Regressions of the license income. We do not observe the exact value for license income but
only the interval in which it falls. Moreover, the observations are right-censored as we observe only
that license income is greater or lower than the threshold value, 1.000.000 EUR, but we do not
know what the upper bound is. For these reasons, we use the interval regression specification that
allows addressing both types of issues. Interval regression assumes that data come from a normal
distribution. In our case, license income is not distributed normally, however we can assume that
its log follows a normal distribution. Therefore, if license income falls within our survey categories,
its log should fall within the logs of these categories.
Interval regression is a generalization of the censored regression model, where the latent variable,
y∗i , is expressed as a function of xi explanatory variables:
y∗i = x
′
iβ + ui with ui ∼ N(0, σ2)
What we observe is yi = y∗i if yiL ≤ y∗i ≤ yiR and yiR = y∗i if yiR ≤ y∗i .
All regressions are run with robust standard errors.
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3.4 Determinants of licensing outcomes
Publication volume. We use the total number of articles in Science and Engineering during the
period 2004-2006, published by researchers of the university, as reported in ISI Web of Science.
Quality of the academic institution and composition of the research. We experimented different
measures of the quality of the academic institutions. In our preferred specification, we take the
number of stars in life science and in engineering affiliated with the university. A star is defined as
appearing on the ISI Web of Science list of highly cited researchers. Zucker et al. (1998) suggest
that star scientists play a central role in both the development of the science and its successful
commercialization. Their importance derives from the tacit component of breakthrough discoveries
which cannot be easily diffused without involving the academic inventor.
As robustness check we use the score on the Shanghai world ranking of universities or specific
components of that score (number of highly cited researchers, publications in Nature and Science,
number of staff who have received the Nobel Prize or the Fields medal).
The number of stars in life science and in engineering also control for the composition of the
research. Institutions with a strong focus on life science and engineering tend to produce output
that is more easily transferred to the industry sector, either because of its applied nature or because
industry is interested in absorbing this output. We control also for whether the university has a
medical school or is a polytechnic school.
Age of the TTO. For European universities we do not know the exact year when the TTO was
created because in the survey we only asked for intervals (between 2003 and 2007, between 1997
and 2002, etc.). Thus we create a discrete variable that takes increasing values for earlier years
of fundation5. The age variable is defined in such a way that the coefficient of this variable in a
regression can be interpreted as the effect of one additional year of experience.
Professor’s privilege. Several European countries used to have a law (commonly referred to
as ”professor’s privilege”) in place according to which the intellectual property generated from
university inventions belonged to the researcher rather than to the university. The professor’s
privilege was abolished in Germany (2001), Norway (2002), Denmark (2004) and Finland (2007).
However, the professor’s privilege is still in place in Sweden and was introduced in Italy in 2005.
One implication of this regime is that university researchers are under no obligation to even report
5The variable takes the value 3 if the TTO has been created between 2003 and 2007, the value 8 if created between
1998 and 2002, 13 if created between 1993 and 1997, 18 if created between 1988 and 1992 and 23 if created earlier
than 1988.
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licensing activities to the technology transfer office. To take this into account we construct a dummy
that assumes the value one if the university is located in Sweden, Italy or Finland. We included
Finland in the definition of the countries with professor’s privilege because it abolished the privilege
only very recently. However, our results are robust to not including Finland in the definition of
countries with professor’s privilege.
Demand for technology. We use the gross domestic product per capita at the regional level
(Europe: country level; US: state level). While we would have preferred to use other controls for
the demand for technology, we could not find series at the regional level that are both available for
all our observations and comparable across countries.
Staffing level. For the US we know how many licensing staff (full time equivalents) are employed
by the TTO. For Europe, we know the total staff in the TTO and the percentage of time they
spend on licensing. Therefore by multiplying the two we have a measure that is equivalent to the
US variable.
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables, distin-
guishing between European Universities and US universities. Large differences are apparent. The
average US university in our sample produces almost twice as many publications as the average
European university in our sample. US universities also have far more highly cited scientists in bi-
ology and engineering. Furthermore, the TTOs from US universities are older and tend to employ
more staff devoted to licensing than their European counterparts.
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Europe (n=177) US (n=142)
Variable: µ σ Min Max µ σ Min Max
Publications 2331 1908 200 8893 4438 4054 200 26366
Stars bio 0.48 1.406 0 12 2.415 5.615 0 50
Stars engineering 0.271 0.901 0 8 1.767 3.526 0 23
Poly 0.079 - 0 1 0.056 - 0 1
Medical School 0.028 - 0 1 0.112 - 0 1
Age 9.6 6.2 3 23 17.4 5.99 3 23
Privilege 0.197 - 0 1 0 - 0 0
GDP per capita 37’683 9887 17053 63588 36’895 5’659 24477 56496
Staff 2.277 2.711 0 24 4.584 3.98 0 22
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3.5 Results
The results of the regression on the number of licenses are displayed in table 2. In column I we show
that if we do not include any control, the coefficient on the US is large and significant. Once we
control for the quantity, quality and composition of the research as well as GDP per capita (column
II), the coefficient on US drops by half but remains significant at the 1% confidence level. This
reduction is hardly surprising as US universities produce more publications and employ more stars
than European universities. In column III, we control for countries that either have in place the
professor’s privilege (Italy and Sweden) or that have recently abolished it (Finland). This reduces
the coefficient on US further. In column IV we add the age of the TTO and the number of staff
employed in licensing. This specification constitutes our preferred, or baseline, regression. When
we add these controls, the coefficient on US becomes small and no longer significant.
In the last column, we allow for interaction effects between US and staff as well as between US
and age. These effects are not significant6
The regression results lead us to conclude that there is no large difference between US universities
and European universities when we consider the number of licenses and control for the relevant
inputs. This continues to be true in various alternative specifications detailed later.
In table 3 we conduct the same exercise with the license income (in log) as the dependent
variable. In column I we introduce the dummy US without adding any control. The coefficient on
US is large, positive and highly significant. When we progressively add the controls as we did for
the number of licenses (columns II, III, IV), the coefficient on US is reduced. However, it remains
large and significant at the 1% confidence level.
As we did before, we include in column V interaction terms between US and age and between
US and staff. Their coefficients are positive but not significant.
6This is also the case for other interaction effects not reported here.
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Table 2 - Results on the number of licenses
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Number of licenses
US 1.197a 0.612a 0.436a 0.023 -0.336
[0.133] [0.144] [0.143] [0.146] [0.374]
poly 0.600b 0.633b 0.423b 0.481b
[0.277] [0.247] [0.187] [0.194]
med school 0.020 0.048 0.021 0.002
[0.211] [0.209] [0.182] [0.178]
publications 0.220a 0.234a 0.123a 0.112a
[0.028] [0.027] [0.025] [0.024]
stars engineering 0.031 0.029 0.022 0.015
[0.022] [0.021] [0.018] [0.018]
stars bio -0.038 -0.046c -0.031c -0.031c
[0.028] [0.027] [0.019] [0.018]
GDP capita 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.010
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
privilege -1.314a -0.975a -0.990a
[0.236] [0.216] [0.216]
staff (log) 0.660a 0.556a
[0.110] [0.144]
age 0.039a 0.036a
[0.010] [0.012]
staff (log) interacted with US 0.280
[0.198]
age interacted with US 0.001
[0.019]
Constant 2.086a 0.986a 1.175a 0.292 0.420
[0.090] [0.349] [0.326] [0.402] [0.425]
Observations 319 319 319 319 319
McFadden R2 0.03 0.08 0.095 0.12 0.121
Robust standard errors in brackets; a significant at 1%, b at 5%, c at 10%
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Table 3 - Results on license income
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
License income (log)
US 3.213a 2.489a 2.125a 1.636a 0.249
[0.308] [0.273] [0.271] [0.272] [0.706]
poly 0.69 0.747 0.535 0.589
0.485] [0.471] [0.444] [0.44]
med school -0.468 -0.441 -0.27 -0.205
[0.501] [0.483] [0.464] [0.467]
publications 0.366a 0.408a 0.252a 0.231a
[0.078] [0.077] [0.078] [0.0791]
stars engineering -0.0064 -0.0297 -0.055 0.063
[0.104] [27,720] [0.0964] [0.0976]
stars bio 0.278a 0.270a 0.242b 0.0296b
[0.098] [0.104] [0.0986] [0.1]
GDP capita 0.04a 0.031b 0.034b 0.034b
[0.015] [0.14] [0.0142] [0.014]
privilege -1.62a -0.993b -1.076a
[0.41] [0.403] [0.399]
staff(log) 0.789a 0.624b
[0.237] [0.258]
age 0.0623a 0.0396c
[0.0198] [0.0233]
staff(log) interacted with US 0.476
[0.522]
age interacted with US 0.0576
[0.43]
Constant 10.78a 8.298a 8.867a 7.644a 8.115a
[0.193] [0.669] [0.608] [0.65] [88,708]
Observations 313 313 313 313 313
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 0.238 0.318 0.349 0.391 0.382
Robust standard errors in brackets; a significant at 1%, b at 5%, c at 10%
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3.6 Robustness checks
Given that the number of observations is relatively small, there is a legitimate concern that our
results may be sensitive either to the definition or to the composition of the sample. For this reason
we conducted a number of robustness checks to verify that the results of modest or no difference in
licensing number but significant difference in license income still hold.
The robustness checks for the number of licenses are displayed in table 7 in the appendix. In
column I we show the baseline regression. In column II, we exclude 5% of observations that had
the largest residuals and 5% that had the smallest residuals. Successively, in column III, we run
the regression without including Finland in the definition of countries with professor’s privilege.
Finally, in column IV, we run the regression without the top performers, Switzerland and Belgium.
The coefficient on US is never significant and remains small. Other robustness checks, not reported
here, such as different proxies for the quality of the institution and for the composition of the
research led to the same conclusion.
The robustness checks for the license income are displayed in table 8 in the appendix. Again,
column I is the baseline regression. In column II we exclude the outliers. In column III, we
include Germany, Norway and Denmark in the definition of professor’s privilege countries. As these
countries abolished the professor’s privilege only recently, the effect of the old legislation might still
be felt on current license income. In column IV and V, we estimate the baseline specification using
an ordered logit and ordered probit model, respectively. In all cases, the coefficient on US is positive
and significant at the 1% confidence level.
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3.7 Heterogeneity within Europe
In our analysis, we have implicitly assumed that Europe was an homogeneous group. Even though
we took into account the professor’s privilege, cross-national differences may go beyond regulations
of intellectual property ownership. While we do not have enough data to analyze cross-national
differences within Europe in detail, the residuals of our regressions may provide some clues.
Figure 3 displays the residuals of the license number regression, averaged by country. A positive
value indicates that on average universities from the relevant country do more licenses than predicted
by our model, while a negative value indicates the opposite. To facilitate the interpretation of
the graph, we computed the residuals from the baseline regression (column IV) but without the
professor’s privilege dummy. As it appears from the figure, Switzerland and Belgium have high
positive residuals, i.e. they make more licenses than predicted by our model. Conversely, Finland,
Norway, Sweden and to a lesser extent the UK have high negative residuals, meaning that they do
less licenses than predicted by the model.
Similarly, figure 4 displays the residuals of the license income regression averaged by country.
Sweden and Norway make substantially less license income than predicted. The worse performance
of Scandinavian countries in licensing outcomes should be related to the fact that professor’s privi-
lege is either still in place or was only recently abolished in those countries. We control for this in the
baseline regression. We have no immediate explanation for the strong performance of Switzerland
and Belgium.
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Figure 3: Residuals of the license number regression
Figure 4: Residuals of the income regression
18
4 Why are European TTOs earning less income from li-
censes than their US counterparts? A qualitative analysis
As we have shown in the previous section, European TTOs earn less income from licenses than
their US counterparts, having controlled for academic quality and research orientation, demand for
technology and TTOs characteristics.
In this section we present evidence on differences between the organization of European and US
TTOs that might explain why European TTOs earn less license income. Because of small sample
size and limited variability within the US for the variables of interest, we are unable to pin down
econometrically the differences in license income performance. However, the set of interrelated
organizational factors discussed here provides a very plausible explanation.
We conjecture the following three hypotheses: 1) US TTOs might be more oriented towards gen-
erating revenue than their European counterparts; 2) US might employ more staff with experience
in the industry sector than their European counterparts; 3) US TTOs have greater flexibility than
their European counterparts in managing their budget. These hypotheses were formulated after
discussions we had with technology transfer representatives in Europe and following the literature
on objectives and incentives at US TTOs. The rationale for the three hypotheses is the following. If
a TTO has generating revenue as primary objective, then it will focus on negotiating those licenses
that ensure higher revenue rather than maximizing the number of licenses negotiated. Moreover,
staff with experience in the industry sector may be more apt at negotiating licenses with private
companies and, especially, financial clauses. Finally, TTOs with greater flexibility in managing
their budget, have also more freedom in setting bonus pay for negotiating high revenue licenses and
offering higher salaries and benefits to attract quality staff.
In both the European survey and the US survey, we asked questions on: 1) the objectives
pursued by TTOs; 2) their metrics of success; 3) whether the head of the TTO has at least five
year experience in the industry sector; 5) how many employees have an experience of at least five
years in the industry sector; 6) whether the TTO receives a direct share of license income.
4.1 Objectives and metrics of success
US and European TTOs were asked to evaluate the following objectives: 1) promote diffusion of
scientific knowledge and technology; 2) generate revenues; 3) promote local economic development;
4) promote national economic development; 5) attract and retain faculty through quality of technol-
ogy transfer services. We used a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not important” to “extremely
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Table 4: Relative importance of objectives
EU US
Generating revenue is more important than promoting local development 20.5% 21.3%
Generating revenue is equally important than promoting local development 34.8% 27.0%
Generating revenue is less important than promoting local development 44.7% 51.7%
Generating revenue is more important than attract and retain faculty 24.8% 24.7%
Generating revenue is equally important than attract and retain faculty 31.4% 28.1%
Generating revenue is less important than attract and retain faculty 43.8% 47.2%
important”. Our prior is that US TTOs tend to focus more on “generating revenue” than their
European counterparts.
The results of the survey show that, in absolute terms, US TTOs tend to value more the objective
of “generating revenue” than their European counterparts. In fact, the percentage of US TTOs
indicating that “generating revenue” is either important, or very important or extremely important
is 80.7%, while the same percentage in Europe is 72.9%7.
However, US TTOs do not give more importance than their European counterparts to generat-
ing revenue, relative to “promoting local development” and “attracting and retaining faculty”. In
fact, Table 4 shows that the percentage of TTOs that indicated that “generating revenue” is more
important than “promoting local development” is very similar for US and Europe. However, the
percentage of respondents estimating that “generating revenue” is less important than “promot-
ing local development” is greater in the US than in Europe. Similar results are obtained, when
comparing the objective of “generating revenue” relative to “attracting and retaining faculty”.
We also asked TTOs to evaluate the following metrics of success: 1) license income; 2) number
of licenses/options executed; 3) number of patents awarded; 4) number of startups established.
In absolute terms, US respondents attach more importance to license income than their Eu-
ropean counterparts. In fact, 86.4% of the US respondents declared that license income is either
important, or very important or extremely important, while in Europe this percentage is 71.4%8.
These results are in line with what we found for the importance of “generating revenue” as an
objective, which seems to be more relevant, in absolute terms, to US TTOs than to European ones.
In relative terms, US TTOs attach less importance than their European counterparts to license
income when compared to the number of licenses negotiated and the number of startups created.
7The percentage of total respondents who indicated that “generating revenue” is either very important or ex-
tremely important is 42.1% for US TTOs and 33.8% or European TTOs.
8When we look at the percentage of respondents who indicated that license income is either very important or
extremely important, again this percentage is higher in the US (50%) than in Europe (40%).
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Table 5: Relative importance of metrics of success
EU US
License income is more important than # licenses 27.5% 19.5%
License income is equally important than # licenses 51.4% 47.2%
License income is less important than # licenses 29.1% 41.6%
License income is more important than # startups 26.2% 22.5%
License income is equally important than # startups 31.4% 39.3%
License income is less important than # startups 42.4% 38.2%
License income is more important than # patents 32.4% 48.3%
License income is equally important than # patents 36.7% 38.2%
License income is less important than # patents 30.9% 13.5%
However, US TTOs attach more importance than their European colleagues to license income
relative to the number of patents filed.
4.2 Staff with experience in the industry sector
Our second hypothesis was that US technology transfer professionals are more experienced at ne-
gotiating the financial clauses of licensing contracts. Very often, when discussing with academic
researchers and private companies in Europe, we heard the story that TTOs personnel lack ad-
equate experience to negotiate with private companies because they do not understand industry
logic and goals.
To verify whether US technology transfer professionals are more experienced at negotiating
licenses, we decided to include in our survey two questions asking whether the head of a TTO
has at least five year experience in industry and how many licensing staff have at least five year
experience in industry. The logic behind these questions is that TTOs staff with experience in
industry is more acquainted with the goals and the modus operandi of private companies than staff
with no such experience. Moreover, the question relative to the head of a TTO was motivated on
the basis that the goals and the activities a TTO pursues can be influenced, at least in part, by the
convictions of their head.
The results of our survey reveal clearly that in the US there is a larger number of TTO directors
with experience in industry than in Europe. 77% of the US respondents declared that the head of
their TTO had at least five years experience, while in Europe this percentage was 43%.
We are conscious that our measure for experience in industry is imperfect, mainly because we
do not know in what consists this experience. We examined some of the CVs (available on line) of
TTO directors in the US to verify whether they held qualified positions while working for industry.
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We present some examples. The head of the TTO of the MIT spent 20 years in industry, primarily
in the fields of membrane separations, medical devices and biotechnology at such companies as
Amicon, Millipore and Applied Biotechnology. The head of the TTO of the Emory University,
served as in-house patent counsel for an international pharmaceutical corporation for seven years.
The head of the TTO of the University of Vermont has ten year of experience in the Science and
Medical Products Divisions of Corning Glass works. The head of the TTO of the University of
Boston had co-founded two companies: Kytogenics Inc. and Genmap Inc. Presenting the whole list
would be too long. The message, however, is that by going through the CVs of TTOs directors in
the US it emerges that, in the vast majority, they have held very qualified positions while working
in private companies.
When we look at the number of staff with experience in industry, once again the difference
between the US and Europe is significant. On average the US respondents have in 2.6 licensing
staff with experience in industry, while in Europe 0.8.
In conclusion, our initial prior on US TTOs being more acquainted with industry values and
modus operandi and more skilled at negotiating license contracts seem to be confirmed by our
survey results.
4.3 Flexibility in managing TTO budget
Our third hypothesis was that US technology transfer professionals might have a greater flexibility
in managing their budget than their European counterparts. This, in turn, might imply greater
freedom in setting bonus pay to reward TTOs staff for negotiating high revenue licenses. It might
also imply that TTOs have greater discretionality in offering better salaries and bonus to attract
quality staff.
As a proxy for budget flexibility we use whether a TTO receives a direct share of license income.
By direct share we mean that a portion of license income has to be directly allocated to the TTO,
rather than being first assigned to the university and then reassigned to the TTO, on a discretionary
basis.
The results of our survey tend to confirm our prior and show that there is a significant difference
between the US and Europe in terms of whether TTOs receive a direct share of license income.
67.1% of TTOs in the US receives a direct share of license income, while in Europe the percentage
is 28.3%.
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5 Conclusions
Are the US outperforming Europe in university technology licensing? The answer is: yes but only
for license income.
Using new survey data on university technology transfer offices in US and in Europe together
with public information available on US and European universities, we examined whether US tech-
nology transfer offices conclude more licenses and earn more license revenue than their European
colleagues.
Our first result is that, having controlled for the quality of the academic institutions, their re-
search orientation and the number of publications, for the local demand of technology and TTOs
staff and age, we cannot conclude that US TTOs make more licenses than their European coun-
terparts. In fact, the coefficient for the US dummy is small and insignificant. This result is robust
to various combinations of the controls and to removing observations with high residuals from the
sample.
Our second result is that, having controlled for the same factors as for the number of licenses,
US technology transfer offices earn more revenue from licenses that their European counterparts.
The coefficient for US is positive and highly significant with any combination of the controls we
tried.
The situation in Europe is not homogeneous. Switzerland and Belgium outperform the other
European countries, whereas Sweden, Italy and Finland underperform the rest of Europe. The
professors’ privilege policy, in place in Sweden and in Italy and recently abolished in Finland, seems
to be the most likely cause for these countries to generate less licenses and less license revenues.
We undertook a qualitative analysis to understand the differences in organization and staffing
that might explain why US technology transfer offices earn more license revenue. We conjectured
that US TTOs have more staff with experience in industry and, thus, they understand better the
modus operandi of firms and they are more skilled at negotiating the financial clauses of licensing
contracts. On average, US TTOs employ 2.8 staff with experience in industry, against 0.8 in Europe.
Moreover, 77% of the US respondents contended that their head had at least five years experience
in industry, while in Europe this percentage was 43%.
Our qualitative analysis also points at substantial differences in the way TTOs are financed.
67% of the US respondents said that they receive a direct share of license revenue, whereas in
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Europe this percentage is only 28%. This could translate into better licensing performance through
greater flexibility in hiring practices, bonus pay and the organization of the TTO in general.
Our priors were that US TTOs tend to give more importance to “generating revenue” as objec-
tive than their European counterparts and, therefore, that they have more incentive to negotiate
licenses that potentially generate high revenue. Here, the evidence is mixed. In absolute terms, US
TTOs tend to give more importance to generating revenue than European TTOs. However, they do
not give more importance than European TTOs to revenue generation relative to other objectives
such as local development and faculty service.
We believe our analysis has important policy implications. Within the context of the “European
Paradox”, we analyzed how European TTOs compare to their US counterparts. Our findings
highlight the importance of university inputs, such as publications, and of TTOs size and experience
as factors explaining the gap in the US and Europe in terms of number of licenses concluded and
license revenue.
The different performance in terms of license income need not in itself be a source of concern.
There is nothing in economic theory to suggest that TTOs should maximize license revenue. Social
welfare might be better served by TTOs facilitating local economic development or helping with
the translation of academic research into products.
However, to the extent that revenue generation is an objective (and many TTOs say it is),
then policy changes are advisable to close the gap between the US and Europe. Our qualitative
analysis points at the usefulness of industry experience for TTO staff members and of flexibility
in the organization of the office. However, the exact nature of organizational practices that TTOs
should employ remains a subject for further research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Table of correlations
Variables #lic. US poly med sch. pub. star eng stars bio GDP cap. priv. staff age
#licenses 1.000
US 0.351 1.000
poly 0.081 -0.066 1.000
med school -0.022 0.116 -0.041 1.000
publications 0.721 0.238 -0.025 -0.020 1.000
stars eng 0.685 0.252 0.072 -0.045 0.800 1.000
stars bio 0.581 0.207 -0.012 0.055 0.852 0.753 1.000
GDP capita 0.123 -0.009 0.097 0.102 0.137 0.120 0.147 1.000
privilege -0.173 -0.290 0.078 -0.051 -0.057 -0.075 -0.073 -0.092 1.000
staff 0.663 0.341 0.045 0.025 0.568 0.487 0.423 0.165 -0.212 1.000
age 0.459 0.501 -0.037 0.048 0.314 0.252 0.236 -0.024 -0.299 0.487 1.000
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A.2 Robustness checks: number of licenses
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
VARIABLES licenses licenses licenses licenses
US 0.023 -0.027 0.118 0.052
[0.128] [0.120] [0.127] [0.127]
poly 0.423b 0.413b 0.338c 0.412b
[0.194] [0.186] [0.198] [0.195]
med school 0.021 0.160 0.056 0.029
[0.206] [0.190] [0.202] [0.207]
publications 0.123a 0.140a 0.100a 0.125a
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028]
star engineering 0.022 0.025 0.027 0.023
[0.024] [0.027] [0.024] [0.024]
superstars bio -0.031 -0.012 -0.031c -0.031
[0.020] [0.024] [0.019] [0.020]
GDP capita 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.008
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
privilege -0.975a -0.878a -0.833a -1.015a
[0.195] [0.180] [0.194] [0.223]
lstaff good 0.660a 0.640a 0.732a 0.645a
[0.110] [0.101] [0.117] [0.111]
cat age 0.039a 0.036a 0.040a 0.037a
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
Constant 0.292 0.251 0.486c 0.337
[0.276] [0.260] [0.285] [0.281]
Observations 319 289 306 319
McFadden R2 0.12 0.138 0.126 0.119
(baseline) (excluding (excluding (not counting
outliers) CH & BE) FIN as privilege)
Standard errors in brackets
a significant at 1%, b at 5%, c at 10%
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A.3 Robustness checks: license income
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
VARIABLES log license income
interval interval interval ordered ordered
regression regression regression logit probit
US 1.636a 1.654a 1.630a 1.708a 1.005a
[0.272] [0.253] [0.286] [0.286] [0.166]
poly 0.535 0.518 0.526 0.535 0.296
[0.444] [0.415] [0.447] [0.467] [0.267]
med school -0.271 -0.182 -0.230 -0.278 -0.182
[0.465] [0.434] [0.470] [0.472] [0.280]
publications 0.252a 0.259a 0.237a 0.272a 0.147a
[0.078] [0.075] [0.079] [0.082] [0.047]
star engineering -0.056 0.029 -0.057 0.009 -0.022
[0.096] [0.102] [0.097] [0.108] [0.058]
superstars bio 0.242b 0.215b 0.228b 0.265b 0.159a
[0.099] [0.094] [0.099] [0.115] [0.060]
GDP capita 0.034b 0.028b 0.042a 0.031b 0.019b
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.009]
privilege -0.994b -0.848b -0.444 -0.952c -0.548b
[0.403] [0.374] [0.321] [0.509] [0.274]
lstaff good 0.789a 0.783a 0.799a 0.755a 0.483a
[0.237] [0.222] [0.246] [0.255] [0.144]
cat age 0.062a 0.066a 0.071a 0.063a 0.038a
[0.020] [0.018] [0.020] [0.021] [0.012]
Constant 7.644a 7.746a 7.285a
[0.651] [0.607] [0.642]
Observations 313 293 313 313 313
(baseline) (excluding (privilege (ordered (ordered
outliers) for DE, NOR, DEN) logit) probit)
R2 0.391 0.442 0.375 0.276 0.277
Standard errors in brackets
a significant at 1%, b at 5%, c at 10%
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